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INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Agent
Brian Terry was killed in a gun battle along the border between
the United States and Mexico.1 Police traced two AK-47 assault rifles found at the scene to Jaime Avila, whom officials at
the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had
previously suspected of purchasing weapons in the United
States on behalf of “violent Mexican drug trafficking organizations.”2 Instead of arresting Avila and a number of other “straw
purchasers,” however, ATF allowed him to continue buying
guns in order to trace his purchases to a “large-scale gun trafficking organization.”3 Unfortunately, this “Operation Fast and
Furious” did not turn out as ATF had hoped. Agents never
captured any high-level targets, and of the nearly 2000 guns
that were allowed to “walk,” only a little over 700 were ever
recovered.4 Even worse, two of the guns had apparently been
used to murder a federal law enforcement officer.
Operation Fast and Furious became the subject of congressional scrutiny a year later, when ATF whistleblowers anonymously reported the program to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.5 In February 2011, Justice Department officials
flatly denied that any guns had been allowed to walk to traffick1
James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, ATF Gunrunning Probe Strategy Scrutinized After Death of Border Patrol Agent, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 11:03 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/01/AR
2011020106366.html [http://perma.cc/BS86-8LAN].
2
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF ATF’S
OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS AND RELATED MATTERS 1 (2012), http://
www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/s1209.pdf [http://perma.cc/PX3Y-8ZH5].
3
Id.
4
Id. at 203 & tbl.4.1.
5
Id. at 2.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN105.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 3

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

28-OCT-15

13:18

225

ers.6 Congress’s investigation pressed on, however, and in December, the Department retracted its earlier denial.7 As a
result, even after the Department admitted fault in 2012 for
Operation Fast and Furious,8 Congress continued to demand
an explanation for its apparently false initial denial of the program’s existence.9 The House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, which had participated in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s investigation of Operation Fast and Furious,10 characterized this denial as “at best, a serious
breakdown in communications . . . [and] at worst, . . . a conscious effort . . . to mislead the [Senate] Committee.”11
To determine what had gone wrong, the House Committee
subpoenaed all of the Department’s internal documents related
to its February 2011 statement.12 Attorney General Eric
Holder refused to turn over any documents created after the
statement was issued, however, claiming that President Barack
Obama had asserted “[e]xecutive privilege” over them.13 The
Committee held Holder in contempt of Congress for his failure
to comply with the subpoena—making him the first sitting cabinet secretary to receive such a citation14—and brought suit to
enforce the subpoena in August 2012.15
In their pretrial motions, both the House Committee and
the Department asserted plenary legal authority over the disputed documents.16 The Department argued that because the
documents contained internal discussions about its response
to an ongoing congressional investigation, enforcing the sub6
Id. Letter from Ronald Weich, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.
(Feb. 4, 2011) (describing ATF efforts to “dismantl[e] firearms trafficking organizations”), reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note
2, at app. D.
7
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 2, at 329.
8
See id. at 209. The Justice Department’s Inspector General concluded that
Operation Fast and Furious “lacked realistic objectives, did not have appropriate
supervision . . . , and failed to adequately assess [its] public safety consequences.”
Id.
9
Complaint at 7, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-01332 (ABJ)).
10
Id. at 4.
11
Id. at 11–12.
12
Id. at 8.
13
Id. at 10.
14
Ed O’Keefe & Sari Horwitz, House Votes to Hold Attorney General Eric
Holder in Contempt, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/fast-and-furious-house-plans-vote-on-holding-eric-holder-in-con
tempt/2012/06/28/gJQAznlG9V_story.html [http://perma.cc/QZY3-VRBE].
15
Complaint, supra note 9, at 1.
16
Order at 3–4, Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:12-cv-01332 (ABJ)).
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poena would undermine its ability to respond effectively to future investigations.17 The Committee, by contrast, claimed
that its constitutional authority to subpoena executive documents was absolute.18
Neither argument persuaded the district court. Instead of
resolving the dispute on the parties’ motions, it instructed the
Department to produce a list describing each allegedly privileged document and “the grounds upon which the privilege is
actually being invoked.”19 Then, the court explained, it would
resolve the dispute by balancing the parties’ competing interests, “which the [parties] cannot articulate with specificity—
and the Court cannot assess—until it is clear which documents are being withheld.”20
The parties’ abstract, quasi-constitutional claims—and the
court’s unwillingness to consider them—illustrate a central difficulty in the law of executive privilege. Although the existence
of some privilege of executive confidentiality has been clear
since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in United States
v. Nixon,21 the contours of that privilege have seen little clarification in the forty years since Nixon was decided.22 Thus,
when government officials assert the privilege against Congress
in litigation, the debate frequently degenerates into “patently
conflicting assertions of absolute authority” in which “[e]ach
branch of government claims that . . . its actions are unreviewable by the courts.”23 And courts, lacking any analytical rubric
to evaluate such claims, often simply refuse to adjudicate these
disputes.24
This Note poses a solution to this problem by establishing a
clearer doctrinal foundation for the executive privilege. Al17
See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 27–30, Holder, 979 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:12-cv-01332 (ABJ)).
18
See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 25–33, Holder, 979 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:12-cv-01332 (ABJ)).
19
Order, supra note 16, at 4.
20
Id. at 5.
21
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
22
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 742–45 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing
Nixon and its subsequent history).
23
United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal after
remand, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
24
See, e.g., id. As a result, scholarly commentary on the executive privilege
in the context of congressional investigations has tended to focus on whether
disputes over information between the President and Congress are even justiciable. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1083 (2009) (arguing against justiciability); David A. O’Neil, The Political
Safeguards of Executive Privilege, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1079 (2007) (arguing in favor of
justiciability).
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though commentators and lower courts seem to have assumed
that the executive privilege recognized in Nixon is a doctrine of
constitutional law,25 this Note will argue it actually represents
a cluster of subconstitutional evidentiary privileges rooted in
federal common law.26 Like traditional common-law privileges,
this Note contends, courts can incrementally create, modify,
and abrogate Nixon privileges in response to narrow policy interests that crop up in specific factual situations.27 And like
other federal common-law doctrines, Nixon privileges are subject to legislative revision.28
When the Nixon privilege is understood in this way—as
“constitutional common law”29—many problems with its application and expansion fall away. The Fast and Furious litigation, for example, suggests that courts lack “judicially
manageable standards” to resolve political-branch information
disputes because those disputes turn on abstract questions of
political and constitutional balance.30 But a common-law approach allows courts to apply the Nixon privilege incrementally,
creating narrow rules that apply only in certain factual situations.31 Thus, under the proposed regime, courts can evaluate
the branches’ competing interests in particular cases without
ruling on the general balance of constitutional power.
Part I of this Note will survey the background of executive
privilege, including its life as a common-law doctrine before
Nixon, its transformation into quasi-constitutional doctrine in
Nixon, and its historical status as a political process in the
context of congressional demands for information. Part II will
then more thoroughly introduce the idea of constitutional common law and argue that the executive privilege is a species of it.
25
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745 (“The [Nixon] privilege is rooted in
constitutional separation of powers principles and the President’s unique constitutional role; the deliberative process privilege is primarily a common law
privilege.”).
26
See infra Subpart II.B.
27
See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
28
See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975) (advocating “a constitutional
common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress”).
29
See id. This Note applies Professor Monaghan’s concept of “constitutional
common law” to the executive privilege. See infra Subpart II.A.
30
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (defining nonjusticiable “political question[s]” as lacking “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resol[ution]”).
31
This Note will argue, for example, that the Fast and Furious case should be
resolved by crafting an “executive privilege” that applies only to congressional
requests for information about an executive official’s response to a previous congressional investigation. See infra Subpart III.B.
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Part III will apply this understanding of the privilege to the facts
of Committee on Oversight & Government Reform v. Holder,32
the case arising out of the Fast and Furious dispute. The Conclusion will summarize the insights suggested by a constitutional common-law approach to executive privilege.
I
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Courts and commentators have applied the term “executive
privilege” somewhat unevenly to describe various attempts by
government officials to shield information from compelled disclosure.33 Courts, for example, have long recognized government officials’ powers to withhold information from disclosure
in litigation under certain circumstances.34 Although these
common-law privileges are not uniformly referred to as “executive privileges,” they share structural characteristics, policy
objectives, and precedential foundations with the executive
privilege identified in United States v. Nixon.35 Likewise, although the President is also said to assert his “executive privilege” where he refuses to turn over information to Congress,
such disputes have historically been resolved through the political process rather than formal litigation.36 This Part will give
a brief introduction to the family of executive privileges in both
litigation and congressional investigations.
A. Common-Law “Executive Privileges” in Litigation
1. The Military-and-Diplomatic-Secrets Privilege
By the time the Supreme Court first acknowledged the
“privilege which protects military and state secrets” in United
States v. Reynolds, the doctrine was already “well established
in the law of evidence.”37 In Reynolds, the Court upheld the
confidentiality of a U.S. Air Force report on an aircraft crash,38
32

979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing “a
variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information” claimed by executive
officials).
34
See id. at 738 (noting that “[h]ints” of an executive privilege cropped up as
early as the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803)).
35
For terminological uniformity, this Note will refer to any privilege possessed
exclusively by members of the executive branch in their official capacity as an
“executive privilege.” When I refer to the “executive privilege” recognized in United
States v. Nixon, I will call it the “Nixon privilege.”
36
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 739.
37
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953).
38
Id. at 12.
33
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which had occurred during a test of “secret electronic equipment.”39 Three civilian observers died in the crash, and their
survivors brought suit,40 apparently claiming that the “secret”
technology had caused the accident.41
In upholding the Air Force’s claim of privilege, the Reynolds
Court applied a “formula of compromise” that future courts
would imitate in adjudicating executive-privilege claims.42 On
the one hand, the Court admonished that “[j]udicial control
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice
of executive officers.”43 But it also recognized that disclosure of
military secrets in litigation could “expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”44 It noted that 1953, the year of the decision, was “a
time of vigorous preparation for national defense,” during
which “newly developing electronic devices . . . must be kept
secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited.”45
Thus, the Court concluded, the Air Force’s specific need for
secrecy—especially given the United States’ involvement in the
Cold War—outweighed the plaintiffs’ need for the crash report
to prove their civil claims.46
2. The Deliberative Process Privilege
The deliberative process privilege, a less powerful but more
easily invoked common-law doctrine, protects policy discussions between government officials and their aides.47 Its purpose is to facilitate “frank expression and discussion” among
policymakers—“those upon whom rests the responsibility for
making the determinations that enable government to
operate.”48
A court reviewing a deliberative process claim follows the
“formula of compromise” applied in United States v. Reynolds.
39

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
41
See id. at 11 (denying the plaintiffs’ claims because “[t]here is nothing to
suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case, had any causal connection
with the accident”).
42
Id. at 9–10.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 10.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 11–12. The plaintiffs’ claim of necessity was also diminished by the
fact that the Air Force had offered to allow the plaintiffs to question the airmen
who survived the crash regarding any nonprivileged matter relevant to the case.
Id.
47
See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324
(D.D.C. 1966).
48
Id.
40
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But first, it must determine whether the privilege’s core policy
rationale—candor in future policy discussions—is threatened
by the disclosure order at hand.49 Thus, the deliberative process privilege applies only if the assertedly privileged communication is (1) predecisional, such that it took place before a
policy decision was made, and (2) deliberative, such that it
urged the adoption of a particular course of executive action.50
The privilege will not protect a communication that merely explains a prior decision, for example, or one that reports facts
without synthesizing them into a policy recommendation.51
Once these threshold requirements are met, the court determines the risk that disclosure in the present case would chill
future discussions among policymakers and then balances
that risk against its need for the withheld evidence to resolve
the case at hand.52 Considerations that might affect the need
for the evidence include the stakes of the litigation, the relevance of the evidence, and the availability of other nonprivileged evidence that is relevant on the same point.53
Considerations that might raise the specter of “future timidity
by government employees,” on the other hand, might include
the gravity of the policy decision in question, the government’s
lack of involvement in the litigation, or the lack of any allegation of wrongdoing against the government.54
B. United States v. Nixon: An Executive Privilege with
“Constitutional Dimensions”
Against this common-law background, the Supreme Court
in United States v. Nixon first recognized an executive privilege
rooted in the constitutional balance of power between the Executive and its coequal branches of government.55 Nixon involved
the criminal prosecution of several individuals for their involvement in the 1972 wiretapping of the Democratic National Com49
A similar requirement was implicit in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Reynolds, which required the Air Force to show a “reasonable danger” that military secrets would be divulged by the disclosure of its report. See Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 10.
50
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737–38 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
51
Id. at 737.
52
See id. at 746.
53
Id. at 737–38.
54
Id. (quoting In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency,
967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
55
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707–08 (1974).
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mittee’s Watergate Hotel headquarters.56 Although President
Nixon himself was not indicted, the Watergate special prosecutor secured a subpoena for audiotape recordings of various
conversations between Nixon and his aides.57 These recordings, the special prosecutor argued, would incriminate the
President’s coconspirators.58
In refusing to comply with the subpoena, President Nixon
did not assert the common-law deliberative process privilege.59
Instead, he argued that as President, he possessed unreviewable constitutional authority to resist the court’s order.60 First,
Nixon claimed, this authority is incidental to the President’s
Article II powers.61 As the Court would acknowledge in its
opinion, “Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests.”62
Such an encumbrance on the President’s ability to solicit candid advice would impair his capacity to “take care that the laws
be faithfully executed” as required by Article II.63 Second,
Nixon argued that general separation-of-powers principles prohibited courts from compelling the President to disclose
information.64
The Court agreed with Nixon that a “privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art[icle]
II powers” inheres in Article II and in the separation of powers
between the branches.65 It disagreed, however, that the privilege could never be overcome. “[A]n absolute, unqualified privilege,” the Court explained, “would plainly conflict with the
function of the courts under Art[icle] III,” which includes
“do[ing] justice in criminal prosecutions.”66
Like its common-law predecessors, therefore, the Nixon
privilege is a balancing act: it facilitates candid policy advice on
56
Id. at 687–88; see also United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, 1328
(D.D.C. 1974) (denying President Nixon’s motion to quash the subpoena at issue
in Nixon).
57
Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. at 1328, 1331.
58
See id. at 1328.
59
Perhaps this was because he believed that it would be too easily overcome.
See supra notes 49–54 (explaining the requirements for invoking the privilege).
60
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703.
61
Id. at 705.
62
Id.
63
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715 (explaining that the
privilege reflects “the singularly unique role under Art. II of a President’s communications and activities, related to the performance of duties under that Article”).
64
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
65
Id. at 705.
66
Id. at 707.
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the one hand67 and the just resolution of litigation on the
other.68 But the Nixon privilege also possesses “constitutional
dimensions”69 because derogating from either norm in the context of an interbranch information dispute would impair one
branch’s ability to exercise its responsibilities under the Constitution.70 The Nixon privilege encourages deliberative candor
not just because candid advice leads to good policy decisions
but also because it allows a President to exercise his Article II
powers more effectively.71 Likewise, the privilege is not overcome by a criminal litigant’s showing of need simply because
such a result is fair but also because the litigant’s need invokes
the judiciary’s “manifest duty” under the Constitution to ensure the integrity of criminal proceedings.72 In this way, the
privilege is “inextricably rooted” in the Constitution.73
After identifying the constitutional interests at stake, the
Court proceeded to balance those interests in the context of
Nixon’s refusal to disclose his tapes. The Court was incredulous that “advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their
remarks . . . because of the possibility that such conversations
will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.”74 It
therefore concluded that the chilling effect of disclosure would
be minimal.75 “[W]ithhold[ing] evidence that is demonstrably
relevant in a criminal trial,” by contrast, “would cut deeply into
the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the
basic function of the courts.”76 As a result, the Court ordered
disclosure.77
Thus, Nixon recognized a privilege allowing the President to
withhold communications with his policy advisors78 from dis67

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711 (“It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate [a criminal defendant’s constitutional] guarantees, and to accomplish that it
is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.”).
69
Id.
70
See id. at 707 (“To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an
absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal
statutes . . . would . . . gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.”).
71
See id. at 705 (“[T]he privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of
each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.”).
72
Id. at 711.
73
Id. at 708.
74
Id. at 712.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 713–14.
78
The Court later clarified that the Nixon privilege—similarly to the deliberative process privilege—applies only to communications made in the course of the
President’s performance of his Article II duties. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977).
68
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closure in litigation.79 But it did not expressly limit the application of its reasoning to disclosures implicating the
deliberative-candor rationale.80 If the Court could justify the
creation of a privilege facilitating deliberative candor because
that policy interest assumed “constitutional dimensions” in political-branch information disputes, it must find principled
grounds to distinguish other confidentiality interests that
could affect the constitutional balance in similar situations.
Absent such grounds, a refusal to expand the privilege to cover
such confidentiality interests seems indefensible.
C. The “Escalation Model”: Executive Privilege in
Congressional Investigations
Historically, presidential refusals to disclose information to
Congress have played out as political rather than legal
processes,81 and courts have only rarely been involved.82 Instead, Congress and the President tend to engage in a sort of
tango that is aptly deemed the “escalation model.”83 Each
branch exercises its various political prerogatives against the
other—denying appointments, vetoing legislation, and so
forth—until one branch capitulates and relinquishes its claim
to the information.84 Although this practice appears to have
taken shape by default rather than by design,85 some scholars
have argued that it is in fact the preferable way of resolving
interbranch information disputes.86 This is because it ensures
79
Initially, Nixon’s holding was limited to the context of criminal litigation.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711–12, 712 n.19 (“We are not here concerned with . . . the
need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with . . . congressional demands
for information . . . .”). However, the privilege has subsequently been applied to
civil litigation. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 381–82 (2004).
80
This is one of several ways in which the Court’s holding in Nixon was
remarkably narrow. For further discussion, see infra notes 144–149 and accompanying text.
81
For an overview, see Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1383, 1395–1405 (1974).
82
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
83
See O’Neil, supra note 24, at 1084–85.
84
Id.
85
Cf. id. at 1087 (“[S]cholars have inferred an intent by the Framers to embed
in the basic structure of the political process the necessary means for resolving
information disputes.”).
86
See id. at 1084–85 (“At some point, this escalating process . . . will end
when one branch concludes that the continued expenditure of political capital
does not justify the institutional benefits of victory. That precise point, the theory
maintains, provides the best approximation of the correct constitutional balance
between the branches.”).
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that whichever branch values a piece of information most will
ultimately gain control of it.87
Two problems with the escalation model should be immediately apparent. First of all, it is far from clear that whichever
political branch values a piece of information most should control that information.88 Suppose Congress seeks to investigate
presidential wrongdoing, for example, but the President is willing to spend more political capital to conceal his misdeeds than
his opponents in Congress are to uncover them. Although the
escalation model would dictate confidentiality in such a case,
from a normative perspective, disclosure is clearly preferable.
Second, the escalation model seems wasteful. Why put appointments on hold and delay the passage of legislation if a
court can adjudicate the dispute according to neutral, external
standards?89
Proponents offer several reasons that the escalation model
is, despite its flaws, preferable to judicial resolution of politicalbranch information disputes. One has already been suggested:
such disputes may present nonjusticiable “political questions.”90 In his seminal article on executive privilege, Archibald
Cox, the first Watergate special prosecutor,91 argued that the
difficulty of developing judicially manageable standards for
resolving information disputes between Congress and the
President was reason enough to keep those disputes out of
court.92 Could a judge realistically be expected, Cox asked, to
“decide whether the legislative need [for subpoenaed information] is real or only professed by Senators or Representatives
seeking political advantage . . . ?”93 Finding himself unable to
“formulate [a] rule of law not turning upon judgments of motive
and political desirability,” Cox concluded that “questions of
executive privilege vis-à-vis Congress” should be “[left] to the
ebb and flow of political power.”94
87

Id.
O’Neil compares this premise to the flawed reasoning of the “political safeguards” theory of the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 1098–1101.
89
Some proponents of the escalation model have even gone so far as to
suggest that Congress could impeach and, if necessary, imprison noncompliant
executive officials. See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 24, at 1152–53.
90
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
91
President Nixon dismissed Archibald Cox in what would later become
known as the “Saturday Night Massacre.” See Bart Barnes, Watergate Prosecutor
Faced Down the President, WASH. POST (May 30, 2004), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1755-2004May29.html [http://
perma.cc/LQP6-3VJ9].
92
Cox, supra note 81, at 1430.
93
Id. at 1429.
94
Id. at 1429–32.
88

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN105.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 13

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

28-OCT-15

13:18

235

Another objection to the judicial resolution of politicalbranch information disputes is that it would create restrictive
precedent. Because any such judicial decision would “have an
impact beyond the precise factual issue that was litigated,” the
argument goes, it would likely “impinge upon [the branches’]
flexibility” in future negotiations.95 The D.C. Circuit articulated this concern in United States v. AT&T, in which it declined
to adjudicate the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s refusal to
comply with a congressional subpoena for information regarding a warrantless wiretapping program.96 Because “[a] court
decision selects a victor,” the court explained, “[it] tends thereafter to tilt the scales.”97 Thus, the argument goes, the ambiguity of the branches’ entitlements under the escalation model
is desirable because it encourages careful conciliation rather
than stubborn cross-assertions of “rights” handed down in previous judicial decisions.98
This review of the objections to the justiciability of politicalbranch information disputes highlights some of the most salient points raised by scholars and courts. The debate itself is
ongoing, however, and need not be fully recapitulated here.99
For now, it is enough to expose the main strengths and weaknesses of the current escalation model political-branch information disputes. This will allow for critical evaluations of
suggestions for its improvement later on.
Admittedly, the justiciability of political-branch information disputes remains an open question. This does not render
an exploration of the executive privilege in congressional investigations premature, however. First, as this Note will show, a
clearer focus on the source of law from which the executive
privilege is drawn will assuage some concerns about its justiciability.100 Second, although scholars appear to be split on
whether such disputes are justiciable, several courts have recently found the disputes justiciable and proceeded to hear
them on their merits.101 Finally, and perhaps most impor95
Yaron Z. Reich, Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised
Negotiation and Political Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 466, 483 (1977).
96
See United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 385–86 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
97
Id. at 394.
98
See O’Neil, supra note 24, at 1085–86.
99
For a fuller discussion, including an original-intent argument in favor of
the escalation model, see id. at 1083–87.
100
See infra Subpart II.C.
101
See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C.
2008); see also Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725, 728–29 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (not disturbing the district court’s holding
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tantly, Congress in recent years seems to have discarded
whatever historical reluctance it held to roping the federal
courts into its information disputes with the President.102 If
these trends continue, a firm understanding of the privilege will
help courts shape the law of executive privilege to meet the
needs of the political branches, which appear to be evolving.
II
THE NIXON PRIVILEGE AS CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
A. What is Constitutional Common Law?
Professor Henry Monaghan first developed the idea of “constitutional common law” as a tool for understanding judgemade remedies for violations of constitutional rights.103
Monaghan also recognized, however, that his concept was potentially applicable to a variety of other quasi-constitutional
doctrines.104 This Part will briefly introduce the concept of
constitutional common law and then demonstrate its applicability to the executive privilege recognized in Nixon.
Professor Monaghan was particularly intrigued by the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which the Supreme
Court appeared to recast as a nonconstitutional doctrine in
United States v. Peltier.105 The Peltier Court explained that the
rule—which makes evidence obtained in violation of a criminal
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights inadmissible against
that defendant at trial106—is not a personal constitutional right
but rather a judge-made prophylactic measure designed to deter police misconduct.107 Thus, Peltier held, the rule applies
only where its core deterrence rationale is served.108 It does
not, for example, provide for the retroactive reversal of a conviction obtained using evidence whose collection was lawful at the
time but which would be prohibited under subsequently decided case law.109
that “the issues presented to it [concerning President Nixon’s assertion of executive privilege against a congressional subpoena] were justiciable”).
102
See Chafetz, supra note 24, at 1155–56 (criticizing Congress for “shortsightedly[ ] be[ing] an enthusiastic supporter” of what he calls “the courts’ arrogation of [the] power” to decide privilege disputes).
103
See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 2–3.
104
See id. at 40.
105
422 U.S. 531 (1975).
106
Id. at 535.
107
Id. at 538–39.
108
See id. at 535–39.
109
This, of course, is because police officers have no way of foreseeing whether
their now-lawful conduct will later be considered unconstitutional. Retroactively
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Monaghan was chiefly puzzled by the Court’s premise that
the exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights” and not “a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”110 If the exclusionary rule is not part of the substantive content of a defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights, then what is it?111
In posing a solution to this puzzle, Monaghan first questioned the assumption—“fostered,” in his view, by “the Court’s
great prestige”—“that every detailed rule laid down [by the
Court] has the same dignity as the constitutional text itself.”112
While some judicial decisions clearly add to the substantive
content of constitutional provisions, Monaghan argued,
others—like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, Miranda warnings,113 and Bivens actions114—merely establish
one of multiple conceivable mechanisms for carrying the substance of such provisions into effect.115 Rules in this latter
category should not be treated as part of the Constitution itself,
but rather as a “substructure of substantive, procedural, and
remedial rules” that “draw[ ] their inspiration and authority
from, but [are] not required by, various constitutional
provisions.”116
Monaghan characterized this body of law as “specialized”
federal common law117 of the type authorized by Erie v.
Tompkins.118 Under Erie and its progeny, federal law provides
the rule of decision on issues where federal interests
excluding evidence obtained by such conduct would therefore do little to deter
police from intentionally violating the law. Id. at 540–42.
110
Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974));
see Monaghan, supra note 28, at 4.
111
And equally puzzlingly, how can the Supreme Court insist that state courts
apply the rule, as it has since 1961? See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55
(1961). Monaghan envisioned a scenario where a state legislature instructed its
courts to forego the exclusionary rule and instead apply a different remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations—a generous award of money damages, perhaps.
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 7–8 (“[C]an the Supreme Court [nonetheless] insist
upon exclusion of the evidence?”).
112
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 2.
113
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court has
since rejected the notion that Miranda is a purely nonconstitutional doctrine. See
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). This does not necessarily
foreclose a constitutional common-law interpretation of Miranda, however. See
infra note 167.
114
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
115
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 23–24.
116
Id. at 2–3.
117
See id. at 10 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964)).
118
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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predominate over state interests119 and where a uniform national rule is needed to discourage forum shopping and prevent
“inequitable administration of the laws.”120 Furthermore,
where federal law must provide the rule of decision for an issue
but no existing statute or constitutional provision applies, a
court must fashion a rule of federal common law.121 This is
especially so where a federal statute or constitutional provision
appears to authorize federal common-law making.122
Monaghan’s key insight is that the enforcement of constitutional guarantees is an area where federal law must provide
the rules of decision.123 Because the federal government has
historically been charged with enforcing constitutional rights,
its interests predominate over those of the states in deciding
how constitutional rights should be enforced.124 And nationally uniform standards are necessary to establish “a nationwide floor below which state experimentation will not be
permitted to fall.”125 Finally, the Constitution itself should be
read to authorize federal common-law remedies or other doctrines that implement its substantive guarantees.126 Thus,
where Congress has failed to enforce a constitutional guarantee and where the Constitution itself prescribes no remedial
mechanism, courts should fill in the gaps with federal common
law.127 Monaghan calls constitutional rules created pursuant
to this authority “constitutional common law.”128
119
See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1996)
(quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)).
120
See id. at 428 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
121
See Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
122
See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 887 (1986) (arguing that in order to exercise its federal common
law-making power, a court must “point to a federal enactment, constitutional or
statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule”).
123
See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 19.
124
See id. (“The Court’s history and its institutional role in our scheme of
government, in which it defines the constitutionally compelled limits of governmental power, make it a singularly appropriate institution to fashion many of the
details as well as the framework of the constitutional guarantees.”).
125
Id.
126
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 62 (1997) (arguing that
because “some constitutional norms may be too vague to serve directly as effective
rules of law,” courts are responsible for constructing “the doctrinal tests by which
those norms are implemented”).
127
See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 13 (“The Constitution is no less susceptible to interpretation through a consideration of its text, structure and purposes
than are statutes. There is accordingly no a priori reason to suppose that it
should differ from statutes in providing a basis for the generation of federal
common law.” (footnote omitted)).
128
Id. at 3.
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The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, Monaghan concludes, is an example of constitutional common law.129 It applies against the states without being a substantive component
of the Fourth Amendment because, like all federal law, federal
common law preempts contrary state law.130 Treating constitutional remedies as federal common law has other practical
advantages:131 for example, if a judge-made constitutional
remedy is treated as federal common law, Congress can modify
it through subsequent legislation. Thus, while courts can provide immediate, interstitial remedies to enforce constitutional
guarantees, Congress can later revise those remedies using its
superior fact-finding and law-making competencies.132
Monaghan admits that the line between true constitutional
interpretation and rules of constitutional common law can be
difficult to draw.133 In some cases, the Supreme Court specifically designates which parts of its decision are legislatively reversible rules of implementation.134 The warnings prescribed
by Miranda v. Arizona,135 for example, must be given to a person in police custody unless “other fully effective means are
adopted to notify the person of his [or her] right of silence.”136
In other cases, however, constitutional interpretation inevitably “shades into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum.”137
Monaghan’s admittedly imperfect solution is that “the distinction . . . lies in the clarity with which the [rule] is perceived to be
related to the core policies underlying the constitutional provision.”138 Thus, the Constitution does not require a state’s police officers to quote verbatim from the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Miranda, because no single, exact phrasing of Mi129

Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 12–13.
131
Id. at 26–30 (describing the “desirable . . . coordinate roles for the Court
and Congress” that follow when remedies are treated as constitutional common
law).
132
Id. at 28 (“Supreme Court use of constitutional common law, because it
allows a coordinate role for Congress in protecting constitutional liberties, should
increase the likelihood that Congress’ special institutional competence will be
brought to bear on the problems of protecting individual liberty.”).
133
Id. at 31–33.
134
Id. at 31.
135
384 U.S. 436 (1966). An arrestee must be warned “that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
Id. at 479.
136
Id.
137
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 33 (quoting P. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973)).
138
Id.
130
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randa warnings is strictly necessary to appraise arrestees of
their constitutional rights.139
B. Why is Nixon Constitutional Common Law?
Just as the exclusionary rule enforces the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, executive confidentiality allows the President to “take care that
the laws be faithfully executed,”140 as Article II requires, and to
do so independently, as the separation of powers between the
branches implies that he must. At the same time, however,
“[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference
to a privilege of confidentiality.”141 Thus, although the
Constitution seems to require some form of executive confidentiality,142 it provides neither the rule governing that confidentiality nor any language from which one could plausibly deduce
such a rule. And where the Constitution announces a norm
but provides no mechanism to implement it, courts must fashion a rule of federal common law to effectuate it.143 Therefore,
like the constitutional remedies in Monaghan’s analysis, the
Nixon privilege is a doctrine of constitutional common law.
The Supreme Court’s language and reasoning in Nixon is
consistent with this interpretation. By describing the executive
privilege in vague terms, Nixon connected it to constitutional
principles without decisively elevating it to the status of constitutional law.144 The Court described the privilege as “constitutionally based,”145 possessing “constitutional dimensions,”146
and “rooted”—albeit “inextricably”—“in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”147 But it never explicitly cloaked
139

Id. at 33–34.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
141
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). It is also implausible to
suggest that an incidental power like the executive privilege should be read into
Article II’s substantive content, particularly because Article II—unlike Article I—
contains no provision authorizing such incidental powers. Compare U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18, with U.S. CONST. art. II.
142
See, e.g., Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708 (“The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.”).
143
Cf. Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (fashioning
federal common law to fill in the gaps of a federal statute).
144
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting a general
confusion over the privilege’s exact source of law).
145
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 708.
140
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the privilege in the mantle of constitutional doctrine.148 This
ambiguity may have been intentional, given the Court’s overall
reluctance to tip the constitutional balance in the President’s
favor.149 But in any case, treating the privilege as constitutional common law is consistent with the Court’s ambiguous
language.
Finally, the history of the various privileges protecting executive confidentiality interests buttresses the conclusion that
the Nixon privilege is federal common law. From the founding
era until 1974, when Nixon was decided, the various doctrines
allowing government officials to withhold information from
compelled disclosure—including the military-and-diplomaticsecrets and deliberative process privileges—were based in common law.150 The Nixon Court drew on these doctrines in fashioning its own privilege. It distinguished Nixon from cases like
Reynolds, in which the information sought contained military
or diplomatic secrets,151 and it recited almost verbatim the
deliberative-candor rationale of the deliberative process privilege.152 Thus, the executive privilege—like nearly all other evidentiary privileges—is firmly rooted in the common law. The
fact that the Nixon Court happened to consider the interests of
constitutional actors neither requires nor justifies a departure
from these roots.

148
In one particularly puzzling passage, the Court explained that “[c]ertain
powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers,” id. at 705 &
n.16, and referred in a footnote to McCulloch v. Maryland, the case in which the
Court first acknowledged that a branch of government possessed implied powers
incidental to its enumerated powers. See id. at 706 n.16 (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819)). Instead of explicitly applying McCulloch’s analysis to the privilege, however, the Court simply remarked that “the
protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings”—and moved on. Id. at 705–06.
149
See id. at 711–12, 712 n.19 (limiting its holding to the specific facts of the
case); id. at 707 (firmly rejecting the idea that the presidential privilege was
absolute). Indeed, if the Court’s ambiguity was in fact intentional, a constitutional common-law privilege comports with its hesitancy to confer constitutional
power on the executive branch.
150
For a review, see supra Subpart I.A.
151
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710–11. Indeed, interpreting Nixon as true constitutional law seems to lead to an odd situation in which the confidentiality of a
president’s communications are protected as a matter of constitutional law but
military and diplomatic secrets are shielded only by a common-law privilege.
152
See id. at 706 (emphasizing “[t]he President’s need for complete candor and
objectivity from advisers”). Indeed, subsequent courts and commentators have
struggled to distinguish the two doctrines. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729,
745 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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C. Advantages of the Constitutional Common-Law
Interpretation
As Professor Monaghan found was the case with constitutional remedies, treating the Nixon privilege as constitutional
common law comes with a distinct set of practical advantages.
For example, the approach recommends a preexisting body of
law—the common law of evidentiary privileges—as a model for
applying the executive privilege against Congress. And because evidentiary privileges respond to changing relationships
and social values, they are uniquely suited to common-law
development.153 Courts need the flexibility to create, revise,
and perhaps even discard privileges as society evolves.154
A constitutional common-law privilege also provides a solution to the fundamental dilemma faced by courts adjudicating information disputes between the political branches. Until
now, courts have generally assumed that the Nixon privilege is
a doctrine of constitutional law.155 Thus, while courts may
have realized that the escalation model encourages wasteful
political brinkmanship and provides no guarantee of desirable
results, they have seen no viable alternative.156 They have assumed that extending the privilege would irrevocably arrogate
power to one branch and impair both branches’ ability to negotiate in the future.157
By preserving much of the ambiguity—but none of the
wastefulness or arbitrariness—of the escalation model, a constitutional common-law interpretation of Nixon offers a way out
of this conundrum. A common-law approach allows courts to
decide cases on their facts and to construe precedent nar153
Congress recognized this fact by rejecting a fixed set of proposed evidentiary privileges in favor of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which simply provides
that “[t]he common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of
reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege” in federal court. FED. R.
EVID. 501. Thus, Rule 501 “did not freeze the law governing the privileges of
witnesses . . . at a particular point in our history, but rather . . . ‘continue[d] the
evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.’” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1, 9 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
154
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8.
155
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745 (describing the “question of whether
presidential privilege is rooted in the common law or the Constitution” as “not
‘very meaningful’” (quoting Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term—
Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 8 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 (1974)).
156
See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
157
See id. (expressing concern about “tilt[ing] the scales” and concluding that
a “compromise worked out between the branches is most likely to meet their
essential needs and the country’s constitutional balance”).
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rowly.158 For example, as Part III will suggest, the court in
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder
could construct a specific Nixon privilege to govern cases where
Congress seeks information regarding the Executive’s response
to a prior congressional investigation.159 Such narrow, situation-specific rules will generally leave the political branches
with few clues about the rules of decision that will apply to
future information disputes. In most cases, the complex factual background of any given dispute will provide ample
grounds for distinguishing existing precedent. Even when a
prior decision appears to be directly on point, either branch
can urge a court to reverse its federal common-law holding.
Thus, the political branches will be discouraged from relying
too heavily on judicial determinations to structure their rights
vis-à-vis one another.
This ambiguity creates desirable incentives for negotiation
and litigation between the branches. Where an information
dispute’s political stakes are low—or where one branch’s entitlement to information is relatively clear—the risk of setting
adverse precedent should dissuade both sides from litigating
the dispute. But where the stakes of the dispute are high, or
where its resolution is a closer question, the branches will be
incentivized to take the dispute to court and forego negotiations, which would likely be futile anyway. Under this model,
then, the federal judiciary acts as a kind of safety valve. It
incentivizes negotiation in minor information disputes, but
when a truly explosive dispute arises, it offers judicial resolution as an alternative to wasteful political brinksmanship.
Treating the Nixon privilege as constitutional common law
also responds to the concern that information disputes between Congress and the President are nonjusticiable political
questions.160 The difficulty of formulating “judicially manageable standards” for resolving privilege disputes is less present
when each dispute can be decided individually, on its facts,
and without the necessity of annunciating a broad constitutional principle to justify the decision. The branches’ constitutional interests are fairly specific, for example, in cases where
Congress requests information about the Executive’s response
158
Cf. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8 (“The Senate Report accompanying the 1975
adoption of the [Federal] Rules [of Evidence] indicates that . . . [‘]the recognition of
a privilege . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis.’” (quoting S. REP.
No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059)).
159
See infra Subpart III.B.
160
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); supra notes 91–94 and
accompanying text.
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to a prior congressional investigation. It is therefore much less
daunting to identify and weigh those interests than to attempt
to balance the branches’ more general constitutional interests
in having access to information.161
Furthermore, by encouraging courts to construe the holdings of prior executive privilege decisions narrowly, a constitutional common-law approach also assuages concerns about
setting restrictive judicial precedent.162 Because a Nixon privilege would apply only to the factual situation occasioning its
creation, future courts would be free to disregard it except
where that precise factual situation arises again. The danger
that judicial resolution of that case would “tilt the scales” between the political branches in future information disputes is
therefore limited.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, treating the Nixon
privilege as a rule of constitutional common law gives it a more
rigorous theoretical motivation and a clearer role in our constitutional system of government. A useful comparison can be
drawn with ordinary common-law evidentiary privileges, which
control the flow of information from the individual citizen to the
collective in a legal proceeding.163 A common-law privilege
vests an “entitlement” to an individual’s information either in
society, which might legitimately need the information to resolve a conflict between its constituents, or in the individual,
who may have created the information under circumstances
giving rise to a reasonable expectation that it would be kept
confidential. By regulating these conflicts through stable doctrinal rules, the law ensures that conflict resolution and confidentiality can coexist.
Nixon privileges should be similarly viewed as a mechanism for mediating the flow of information between constitutional actors. When Congress and the courts seek information
from executive officials, the branches’ legitimate constitutional
interests conflict in ways similar to the legitimate social interests of the individual and the collective in the common-law
privilege context. By allocating information entitlements between the branches in a principled way, a well-crafted doctrine
of executive privilege can foster a more peaceful constitutional
coexistence. And treating Nixon privileges as federal common
law allows courts—and possibly also Congress—to develop, ex161

See infra Section III.B.2.
See O’Neil, supra note 24, at 1085–86.
163
See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 1.2.1 (2014).
162
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tend, and modify this doctrine so that it can be fitted to its
unique constitutional role.
Thus, a constitutional common-law model of Nixon privileges is consistent with Professor Monaghan’s seminal theory,
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nixon, and the executive
privilege’s roots as a common-law doctrine. It provides an improved incentive structure for negotiation and litigation, addresses concerns about justiciability, and prevents judicial
decisions from needlessly restricting future interactions between the political branches. Finally, it unlocks the privilege’s
potential to act as a judicial tool for regulating the flow of information between the political branches. Courts should therefore interpret Nixon as authorizing a body of constitutional
common-law privileges that together govern information disputes between constitutional actors and, more specifically, between the political branches.
D. Some Potential Objections: Legislative Revision of Nixon
Privileges
Although it addresses many of the issues that currently
plague the law of political-branch information disputes, the
constitutional common-law approach proposed here is not
without its potential criticisms. Perhaps the most immediately
obvious of these is that, like all federal common law, Congress
can modify constitutional common law. Whereas Monaghan
touted this feature as an advantage in the context of enforcing
individual rights,164 at first blush, it seems rather problematic
when applied to Nixon privileges. If Congress can modify the
rules governing executive confidentiality, will it not upset legislatively whatever constitutional balance judges might construct through careful common-law making? Moreover, what
is to stop Congress from abolishing executive confidentiality
altogether?
Constitutional common law is unique, however, in that
Congress cannot abrogate it without providing an adequate
substitute.165 This much is clear from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dickerson v. United States, which struck down a
federal statute that “explicitly eschew[ed] a requirement of [Mi164

See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000). Although Dickerson did not explicitly characterize Miranda as constitutional common law, its
analysis was consistent with that approach. See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 69 (2000) (characterizing Dickerson as an “invitation” to Congress to replace Miranda with a set of
rules that adequately protect a suspect’s right to remain silent).
165
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randa] warnings” and instead considered “the administration
of such warnings as only one factor” affecting the admissibility
of a suspect’s confession.166 Although the Constitution does
not “preclude legislative solutions that differ[ ] from the prescribed Miranda warnings,” the Court explained, any substitute for those warnings would have to be “at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right[s],” which the statute
at issue was not.167 The same analysis would apply to Nixon
privileges: while Congress is free to design a more effective
mechanism to enforce executive confidentiality, an enactment
that seriously undermines executive confidentiality—whether
by wholesale abrogation or otherwise—would be tantamount to
a primary constitutional violation.
Sweeping congressional abrogation might not be the most
salient objection to a constitutional common law of Nixon privileges, however. Because Nixon privileges are deliberately narrow in scope, the reversal of any single privilege is unlikely to
jeopardize the constitutional core of executive confidentiality.
Thus, incremental legislative revision may pose a more serious
threat: Congress, a critic might argue, could selectively overturn individual Nixon privileges without violating Dickerson’s
prohibition on constitutional underenforcement. It could
thereby incrementally shape a body of constitutional common
law that favors its interests over those of the executive branch.
This objection is well taken as a matter of constitutional
theory. But as a matter of political practice, it is unrealistic.
As noted above, in most cases where Congress decides to legislatively reverse a Nixon privilege, the privilege will favor the
Executive. The President will therefore have every reason to
veto its legislative reversal.168 Congress would need to muster
the support of two-thirds of its members to overcome that veto,
but because of the bipartisan unity that this would require,
such overrides would be exceedingly rare. Thus, the likely scenario would proceed as follows: the dominant party in
Congress would seek information from an opposing-party president, attempt to reverse an adverse Nixon privilege, but fail to
garner enough support from the opposing party in Congress to
overcome a presidential veto of its reversing legislation. The
fear that Congress could usurp control of the law of executive
166

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 440 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
168
Of course, if the President instead signs the rule into law, we can assume
that the President and Congress have reached an agreement between themselves
on how to handle a particular aspect of information disputes between them. The
intervention of the courts in such a situation would be unnecessary.
167
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privilege through piecemeal legislative revision is therefore ill
founded.
Of course, it may still seem problematic to leave important
questions of constitutional implementation to the exigencies of
politics. But recall Archibald Cox’s framing of the fundamental
problem presented by political-branch information disputes:
How can judges distinguish between a legitimate congressional
need for information and one that is “only professed by Senators or Representatives seeking political advantage”?169 One
way might be to infer that, when legislators put aside their
political affiliations and join together to reverse a Nixon privilege over an executive veto, they act pursuant not to their competing political interests but rather to their collective
institutional interest in defending congressional power. Thus,
the political system appears to achieve de facto what judges
cannot achieve directly: where Congress attempts to overturn a
Nixon privilege purely for political advantage, the legislature
will split along political lines, and the privilege will stand following an executive veto of the reversing legislation. Where
they truly believe that a Nixon privilege upsets the constitutional balance between the political branches, by contrast,
some legislators in the President’s party may be moved to override the President’s veto, and the privilege could fall.
III
THE NIXON PRIVILEGE IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
If Nixon opens the door to an evolving body of constitutional common-law privileges, equally applicable in litigation as
in congressional investigations, courts will need guidance on
how and when to recognize new Nixon privileges. Of course,
Nixon itself must govern situations where the President seeks
to withhold information on grounds that it contains confidential policy deliberations.170 In this respect, however, Nixon’s
specific deliberative-candor privilege should be thought of as
only one of many possible constitutional-common-law privileges authorized by that decision. In order to determine
whether the privilege should be expanded to cover a new situation, courts should look to the federal common law of evidence,
which provides instructive—although not necessarily binding—guidance on this question.171
169

Cox, supra note 81, at 1429.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
171
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (enunciating the “common-law
principles underlying the recognition of testimonial privileges”).
170
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A. How and When Should the Nixon Privilege Be
Extended?
In general, federal courts follow a four-step process for deciding whether to recognize a new privilege at common law.
First, courts identify the confidentiality interest protected by
the claimed privilege.172 Second, they determine whether that
confidentiality interest is beneficial to the public.173 Third,
they determine whether the benefit to the public in preserving
the confidentiality interest outweighs the detriment to the public caused by withholding the information in question from a
tribunal.174 And finally, if the first three steps indicate that a
privilege should be created, courts determine whether that
privilege should be qualified—that is, potentially overcome by a
litigant’s showing of need—or absolute.175 Fusing this process
with the principles underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in
Nixon leads to a coherent analytical framework for extending
and applying the Nixon privilege.
1. Is There a Confidentiality Interest?
Because privileges exist to encourage different types of
confidential communications, the first step in building a new
privilege is to identify the confidentiality interest that it is intended to protect.176 The attorney-client privilege, for example,
facilitates open communication between attorneys and their
clients. Likewise, the deliberative process privilege protects the
relationship between a policymaker and his or her advisors.177
On its facts, the privilege applied in Nixon protected the
President’s interest in the confidentiality of policy discussions
with his advisors.178 But nothing in the Court’s reasoning limited the privilege’s applicability to that specific type of communication.179 Thus, in determining whether to recognize a Nixon
privilege, a court’s first task is to identify the confidentiality
172

See id. at 10–11.
See id. at 11.
174
See id. at 11–12.
175
See id. at 17–18.
176
See id. at 10–11.
177
See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324
(D.D.C. 1966).
178
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
179
The D.C. Circuit, for example, has extended the privilege to apply to policy
discussion between presidential advisors even if those discussions do not actually
involve the President. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 751–52 (1997) (holding that the Nixon privilege extends to a communication between the President’s
White House advisors, even if that communication never actually reached the
President).
173
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interest alleged. It should then proceed to the second step of
the analysis.
2. Does the Confidentiality Further a Constitutional
Policy?
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which governs claims
of privilege in federal courts, a court may recognize a new privilege only if the confidentiality interest it protects furthers the
public interest.180 Thus, a privilege under Rule 501 protects
the confidentiality of communications between a therapist and
his or her patient because that guarantee of confidentiality
encourages patients to seek psychotherapy.181 By contrast,
courts are unlikely to recognize a privilege protecting communications between criminal coconspirators, because such communications facilitate criminal activities. This characteristic of
common-law privileges gives rise to their key difference from
Nixon privileges: while a Rule 501 privilege can be extended to
protect the confidentiality of communications that serve the
broader public interest, a Nixon privilege can be created only to
protect confidentiality interests that serve some constitutional
purpose.
This distinction is derived from the Court’s reasoning in
Nixon. The public’s interest in the confidentiality of presidential communications was a necessary condition for creating the
privilege as a rule of constitutional interpretation in that case,
but it was not sufficient.182 The Court also based its holding on
the fact that the confidentiality of the President’s deliberative
communications was critical to the independent and effective
execution of his responsibilities under Article II. “Whatever the
nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art[icle] II powers,” the Court explained, “[it] can be said to derive from the supremacy of each
branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.”183 Thus, constitutional concerns in large part justified
the privilege the Court applied in Nixon.
So as the foregoing discussion suggests, the Nixon privilege
should be extended to protect a confidentiality interest if, and
only if, that interest has “constitutional dimensions”—that is, if
the President must be able to expect that a given type of communication will be kept confidential in order to effectively and
180
181
182
183

See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
See id.
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708.
Id. at 705.
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independently perform his Article II responsibilities. It would
be futile for a president to assert, for example, that his communications with the First Lady were privileged under Nixon.184
The President does not need to be able to have confidential
conversations with his spouse in order to carry out his Article II
responsibilities.
3. Does the Balance of Constitutional Policies Favor
Confidentiality or Disclosure?
Just as the confidentiality interest protected by a proposed
Nixon privilege must be “constitutionally based,” any countervailing considerations favoring the disclosure of allegedly privileged information must also affect a coordinate branch of
government’s ability to carry out its constitutional responsibilities.185 This distinction again tracks the Court’s analysis in
Nixon, which balanced the constitutional benefits of its new
privilege against “the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice.”186 Like the President’s interest in confidentiality, the Court explained, the “right to the
production of all evidence at a criminal trial . . . has constitutional dimensions.”187 Article III confers on the federal judiciary a “primary constitutional duty . . . to do justice in criminal
prosecutions.”188 The Sixth Amendment, which affords criminal defendants the right to “be confronted with the witnesses
against [them],”189 and the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits
any deprivation of liberty without due process of law,190 further
reinforce this “constitutional duty.”191 Thus, at least in the
context of criminal litigation, a court considering a new Nixon
privilege must balance the constitutional aspects of the
Executive’s asserted confidentiality interest against the judiciary’s constitutional duty to ensure a fair trial.
184
Of course, these communications might fall under a common-law spousal
privilege, and they might even fall under the deliberative process privilege. See In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (treating the President’s wife as a policy advisor under the deliberative process privilege).
185
See Chad T. Marriott, Comment, A Four-Step Inquiry to Guide Judicial
Review of Executive Privilege Disputes Between the Political Branches, 87 OR. L.
REV. 259, 302–09 (2008) (arguing that courts engaged in a balancing analysis
under Nixon should only consider those confidentiality interests that might “disrupt the constitutionally assigned functions” of another branch of government).
186
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711–12.
187
Id. at 711.
188
Id. at 707.
189
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190
Id. amend. V.
191
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
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Some courts have already explored how this analysis
would play out in the legislative context. In Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,192 for example, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities brought suit to enforce a subpoena against President
Nixon, again for incriminating audiotapes related to the Watergate scandal.193 The tapes, the Senate Select Committee
urged, were needed to determine “the extent of malfeasance in
the executive branch” and “whether legislative involvement in
political campaigns is necessary.”194 In other words, the Committee sought the tapes pursuant to its oversight authority (its
power to expose executive wrongdoing)195 and its fact-finding
authority (its power to ascertain facts about the external world
in order to craft legislation).196
The D.C. Circuit proceeded to hear the case on the assumption that, “at least by analogy,” the executive privilege
applies against a congressional subpoena.197 And the court
was apparently persuaded that, at least in some cases,
Congress’s oversight and fact-finding needs might be sufficient
to overcome an assertion of executive privilege.198 Indeed, it
seems that this must be the case; Congress has the authority
to make law under Article I,199 and it must have the power to
make factual findings in order to carry out this law-making
power effectively.200 The Supreme Court has also held that
Congress has inherent authority to investigate executive
192
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Marriott, supra note 185, at 307–09
(proposing a balancing test for resolving information disputes between Congress
and the President). Although Senate Select was decided before the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, it relied on a D.C. Circuit decision that,
like United States v. Nixon, recognized a qualified executive privilege but nonetheless ordered President Nixon to comply with a criminal subpoena for audiotapes
related to Watergate. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
193
Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 727.
194
Id. at 731 (quoting Brief of the Senate Select Committee at 27–28, id. (No.
74-1258)).
195
Id. (“Congress has, according to the Committee, power to oversee the operations of the executive branch, [and] to investigate instances of possible corruption and malfeasance in office . . . .”).
196
Id.
197
Id. at 729. The case to which the court analogized was Nixon v. Sirica. Id.
198
Id. at 732 (“In the circumstances of this case, we need neither deny that the
Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a general
oversight power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under
the Committee’s constituent resolution.”).
199
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
200
Indeed, Congress’s fact-finding power is often cited as a source of its
unique competence to make law. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 28, at 28–29.
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wrongdoing.201 Recognizing a Nixon privilege, therefore, likely
derogates from Congress’s ability to perform its constitutionally assigned law-making and oversight functions.
Senate Select also provides a model for how specific congressional interests, rather than broad assertions of Congress’s
constitutional supremacy, might be evaluated with respect to
the facts of a particular information dispute. In Senate Select,
the Committee argued that the court categorically lacked “authority to . . . pass judgment on the magnitude of need underlying [its] decision to authorize and issue a subpoena.”202 The
court’s holding, however, was much narrower. Because the
House Judiciary Committee had obtained “copies of each of the
tapes subpoenaed by the Select Committee” in deciding
whether to initiate impeachment proceedings against President
Nixon, the court reasoned, the Committee’s “immediate oversight need for the subpoenaed tapes [was] . . . merely cumulative.”203 The subpoena was therefore not “demonstrably
critical to the . . . fulfillment of the Committee’s functions,”204
and the President’s assertion of executive privilege prevailed.205
Thus, in Senate Select, the D.C. Circuit considered the impact of executive confidentiality on Congress’s ability to carry
out its constitutional responsibilities in a specific situation:
where Congress already possesses the information it seeks to
subpoena. Indeed, the court could have easily proceeded to
create a constitutional common-law Nixon privilege to shield all
such information from disclosure. Although it did not go quite
so far, Senate Select nonetheless provides an example of how a
fact-specific analysis reduces broad constitutional arguments—like the Committee’s insistence that its subpoena
power was unreviewable—to more manageable constitutional
claims. By narrowing a court’s focus to the specific facts of an
information dispute, a constitutional common-law framework
further encourages this approach.
Once the branches’ competing constitutional interests in a
specific situation have been identified, a court’s task is to balance them and determine whether, in light of its “reason and
experience,”206 a privilege should apply. Although this may
201
See Cox, supra note 81, at 1430 (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 200 (1957)).
202
Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 729.
203
Id. at 732.
204
Id. at 731.
205
Id. at 733.
206
Cf. FED. R. EVID. 501 (authorizing federal courts to craft common-law privileges “in the light of reason and experience”).
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seem like a monumental task, several considerations weigh
against the impulse to keep such policy balancing out of
judges’ hands. First, the common-law nature of the Nixon privileges allows judges to decide cases on their facts, read precedent narrowly, and revise prior decisions in light of subsequent
experiences with a rule.207 It is far less daunting to balance
constitutional interests in the context of a specific fact pattern
than to balance them generally and in the abstract. Second,
our legal system trusts judges to balance competing interests
in society at large when presented with claims of common-law
privileges.208 So far, they have been up to the task. Finally,
and perhaps most saliently, the alternative to judicial action is
the escalation model. Compared to a political process with
wasteful collateral consequences and no inherent tendency to
yield justifiable results, a narrow, fact-specific balancing of
constitutional interests appears far less problematic.
4. If a Privilege Should Be Created, Is It Qualified?
Once a court has identified a privilege, its final determination must be whether that privilege is qualified or, relatedly,
subject to any exceptions.209 This final step is closely tied to
the outcome of the policy-balancing analysis required by the
preceding step. Thus, where a confidentiality interest decisively outweighs all relevant countervailing disclosure interests, a court might conclude that the clarity and simplicity of a
categorical, unqualified privilege justify its potential overinclusiveness.210 But where the policy-balancing act yields more
equal results, a judge is more likely to create a qualified privilege, which can be overcome pursuant to a fact-specific evaluation of an adversary’s showing of need.211
Whether a Nixon privilege should be qualified or subject to
exceptions is again a matter for decision by courts. And although this again seems like a demanding task, courts have
successfully performed it in the past. Courts have long held,
for example, that because the deliberative process privilege
protects a less important public policy than the military-anddiplomatic-secrets privilege, the deliberative process privilege
207

See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1996).
209
Id. at 17–18 (declining to create exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege).
210
Id. (creating an unqualified psychotherapist-patient privilege).
211
The privilege applied in Nixon is a qualified privilege. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
208
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is more heavily qualified and easier for litigants to overcome.212
Furthermore, because federal common law can be altered by
subsequent law-making authorities, a court need not worry
that its weighing of constitutional interests will be irreversible if
“reason and experience” later suggest a different result.
Thus, in deciding whether to recognize a privilege allowing
the President to resist disclosing communications to Congress,
a court should ask four questions: (1) Has the President asserted a cognizable confidentiality interest? (2) Does the confidentiality interest further the President’s ability to
independently carry out his functions under Article II? (3) Does
that constitutional interest in confidentiality—as implicated by
the facts of the case at hand—outweigh any cognizable countervailing constitutional interest in disclosure? And (4) does
the confidentiality interest so outweigh the disclosure interest
that the privilege should be unqualified, or are the interests
close enough in relative importance that Congress should be
able to overcome the privilege with a particularized showing of
need? This analysis should guide courts in developing a constitutional common law of executive privilege incrementally,
without fear of exceeding their competence as rule makers.
B. The Nixon Privilege in Action: Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform v. Holder
To demonstrate how this analysis should function in practice, this subpart will suggest a new Nixon privilege and apply it
to the facts of Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
v. Holder. Again, in that case,213 the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform sued the Justice Department to enforce a subpoena for information related to the Department’s previous false statement to Congress. The Justice
Department refused to cooperate, and President Obama asserted executive privilege over the information on the Department’s behalf.214
212
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737, 743 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that while “claims of privilege for military and state secrets would be close
to absolute,” “[t]he deliberative process privilege . . . can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need”).
213
For a full review of the facts of Holder, see supra Introduction.
214
Whether the President has the power to assert the privilege “on behalf” of a
cabinet secretary is itself an unsettled issue. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at
752 (holding that “the privilege should not extend to staff outside the White House
in executive branch agencies”). For the sake of argument, however, this Note will
assume that President Obama has validly asserted executive privilege on Attorney
General Holder’s behalf.
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At first, the case against the Department seems damning.
After all, it made the false statement toward the beginning of a
congressional investigation, and it retracted the statement only
after the investigation had been ongoing for nearly ten
months.215 Because broader constitutional interests are at
play, however, this Part will argue that a Nixon privilege should
be developed and applied to shield the Department’s post-response deliberations.
1. A Confidentiality Interest with Constitutional
Dimensions
In order to construct a Nixon privilege, a court must first
identify an executive confidentiality interest with constitutional
dimensions. In Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder, the Justice Department stressed the constitutional implications of the House Committee’s request, urging
the court to reject “a two-step strategy in which [Congress]
demand[s] information from the Executive Branch about a
matter, and then subsequently request[s] all documents prepared by the Executive Branch in the course of responding to
the previous demand for information.”216 Unless the executive
privilege is interpreted to protect such information, the Department urged, executive-branch officials are left to face congressional investigations “without any protection of confidentiality
whatsoever for the Executive’s deliberations about how to respond.”217 Such a result would “not only chill Executive deliberations” but would also “provide Congress overwhelming
leverage in any investigation or request for information.”218
Having made a compelling argument about the balance of
power in the American constitutional system, the Department
grasped unsuccessfully for a doctrinal hook. It somewhat helpfully analogized its interpretation of the executive privilege to
the attorney work-product doctrine,219 which “recognizes that
confidentiality is necessary to allow for an attorney’s independent functioning.”220 But ultimately, the Department rested its
argument on policy grounds: “A congressional right of access to
the Executive’s congressional response work product,” it
claimed, “would . . . weaken[ ] the dynamic accommodation
215

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 17, at 30.
217
Id. at 26.
218
Id.
219
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (codifying in part the common-law work product
doctrine recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
220
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 17, at 28.
216

R
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process and thus harm[ ] both the separation of powers and the
constitutional system that it supports.”221
In rejecting the Department’s argument, the court was
clear that it was unwilling to address the “hypothetical possibilities” that it raised.222 The Department’s claim “that all
documents . . . can be withheld . . . is unsustainable,” the court
explained, because it failed to demonstrate with specificity that
the assertedly privileged documents met the elements of a cognizable executive privilege.223 Thus, the Department’s position, which may have seemed compelling as a matter of policy,
was problematic in part because it lacked any sort of doctrinal
mechanism to structure its application to the case at hand.
A constitutional common-law approach to Nixon would
provide that missing doctrinal mechanism. Instead of arguing
that, in general, it is poor public policy to allow Congress to
compel the disclosure of communications regarding a response
to a previous congressional subpoena, the Department could
simply urge a new Nixon privilege on the court. A “congressional response privilege” might hold that where, as here, an
executive official communicates in confidence with a policy advisor for the purpose of preparing a response to a congressional
investigation, that communication is privileged against compelled disclosure in future congressional investigations.224
The court would begin its evaluation of the proposed privilege by determining whether it protected an executive confidentiality interest with constitutional dimensions. First, the court
might reason, if executive officials expected that any internal
discussion regarding a response to a congressional subpoena
might be subject to disclosure in a subsequent congressional
investigation, they might be discouraged from preparing responses at all.225 This would not only be detrimental to the
221

Id. at 30.
Order at 4, supra note 16, at 4.
223
Id. at 3–4 (“This assertion does not satisfy either of the essential components of the [deliberative process] privilege, and the Attorney General has not
cited any authority that would justify this sort of blanket approach.”).
224
Although the Department makes an apt analogy to the work product doctrine, the privilege suggested here is modeled after the attorney-client privilege.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
This is more appropriate because the work product doctrine’s policy motivation—
facilitating the adversarial process—is less applicable in congressional investigations, which are less adversarial than traditional litigation. See Hickman, 329
U.S. at 511.
225
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (predicting a similar
chilling effect on policy deliberations).
222
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truth-seeking function of congressional investigations226 but it
would also impair the Executive’s ability to create policy in the
first place. A president, knowing that he would be unable to
fully defend a policy decision in a subsequent congressional
investigation would be forced to more carefully examine his
decisions from the perspective of potential political consequences. Adopting a congressional response privilege, by contrast, would incentivize independent judgment by executive
officials because it would guarantee that, in the event of a
subsequent congressional investigation, those officials could
discuss and develop a defense of their prior policy decisions.
Thus, because executive officials require some degree of
confidentiality in discussing their responses to congressional
investigations—both to respond effectively and to create effective public policy—a privilege protecting that confidentiality
would enable the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”227 Furthermore, a congressional response
privilege is desirable in its own right, because it preserves the
semi-adversarial nature—and therefore the truth-seeking
function—of congressional investigations. Thus, like the privilege recognized in Nixon, the congressional response privilege
protects a confidentiality interest that furthers both constitutional and public policies.
2. Countervailing Congressional Interests and the
Privilege’s Shape
The court would then evaluate the arguments favoring confidentiality alongside Congress’s countervailing constitutional
interests in disclosure. When seeking to discover the
Executive’s thought process in a prior congressional investigation, Congress’s general oversight and law-making powers boil
down to two specific interests: (1) holding the Executive accountable for dishonesty in congressional investigations and,
possibly, (2) enacting legislation in order to correct defects in
the Department’s internal information-sharing process.228 The
court’s task is to balance these interests (and their effects on
226
In this way, the congressional response privilege is similar to the work
product doctrine, which preserves the adversarial nature of litigation by shielding
each litigant’s attorney work product from discovery by the other. See Hickman,
329 U.S. at 511. This rule has a fairness rationale (why should one litigant get the
benefit of the other’s work?) as well as an efficiency rationale (if each side could
discover the other’s work product, neither would have any incentive to produce
work product in preparation for trial). Id.
227
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
228
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 11–12.
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Congress’s Article I powers) against the President’s competing
confidentiality interest (and its effect on his Article II powers).
The outcome of this policy-balancing analysis has a clear
result. On the one hand, where Congress has reason to suspect dishonesty by the Executive, Congress’s need to ensure
veracity in its investigatory proceedings is more pressing than
the President’s general need to control his defense in a congressional investigation. On the other hand, where there are no
indices of wrongdoing in the prior proceeding, Congress’s general interest in legislating best practices with respect to the
Department’s internal procedures is insufficient to overcome
the President’s need for confidentiality in preparing responses
to congressional subpoenas.
Thus, like the common-law attorney-client privilege,229 the
congressional response privilege should come with an exception. Where Congress can show “a factual basis adequate to
support a good faith belief by a reasonable person” that the
President engaged in intentional misconduct in response to a
prior subpoena, the court should inspect the assertedly privileged communications in camera.230 Based on that review, the
court should determine whether wrongdoing likely occurred
and whether the privileged communications should be disclosed. Without the requisite showing, however, the documents must be shielded, even from “the limited intrusion
represented by in camera examination.”231
At first, this solution may seem like sleight of hand. After
all, creating a “congressional response privilege” does not resolve the fundamental difficulty identified by Cox, because it
still requires judges to determine “when [the] congressional
power of oversight [overrides] the interest in encouraging freedom and candor of deliberation in the Executive Branch.”232
But by narrowing the question to a more palatable level of
abstraction, the judicial inquiry goes from impossible to merely
difficult. Indeed, courts routinely follow the process outlined
above to decide claims under the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege.233 Labeling such standards as “judi229

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
230
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Dist.
Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)).
231
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498
F.2d 725, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
232
Cox, supra note 81, at 1430.
233
See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574–75.
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cially unmanageable” would run contrary to judicial
experience.
In Holder, the Department’s actions—particularly the false
statement and its subsequent retraction ten months later—
likely provide the “factual basis” required for the House Committee to obtain in camera review of the allegedly privileged
documents. Absent a clear showing of actual wrongdoing,
however, the court should refuse to order production of the
documents. Thus, rather than chill executive responses to
congressional subpoenas, as would a categorical rejection of
the privilege, the congressional response privilege and its
“crime-fraud exception” would simply encourage executive officials to deal honestly with Congress during investigations in
order to preserve the confidentiality of their communications.
The privilege would apply narrowly, leaving open the resolution
of any other type of interbranch information dispute and avoiding unnecessary encumbrances on future negotiations between
the political branches. And it would be reversible if subsequent
judicial experience proved its underlying assumptions to be
flawed or insufficiently nuanced.
The congressional response privilege therefore provides a
desirable alternative to the extremes urged by both parties in
Holder. Full disclosure would be detrimental to the President’s
ability to carry out his assigned functions and to the investigatory process itself,234 while complete confidentiality might allow executive officials to get away with wrongdoing. A limited
common-law privilege with a time-tested exception is a better
way to reconcile the competing constitutional interests of the
political branches in cases like Holder.
CONCLUSION
By locating the doctrinal foundations of the executive privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon, this Note offers a
workable alternative to the prevailing escalation model of information disputes between Congress and the President. It involves courts in these disputes in a limited, ad hoc fashion that
encourages the political branches to negotiate where possible
but provides a forum for resolving high-stakes claims when
necessary. It assuages fears that setting restrictive precedent
234
The Supreme Court made a similar argument in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1 (1996). “Without a privilege,” the Court pointed out, “much of the desirable
evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek access . . . is unlikely to come
into being.” Id. at 12. The harm done by recognizing the privilege was therefore
reduced. Id.
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will arrogate power to either of the political branches. And
finally, it creates a more productive role for the Nixon privilege
in our constitutional system by equipping the privilege to regulate the flow of information between constitutional actors.
The approach suggested by this Note could be used to answer additional questions about Nixon and executive privilege.
For example, it could help courts decide whether traditional
common-law evidentiary privileges should apply in congressional investigations.235 Or it might help determine whether
the President can assert the privilege on behalf of lower-level
officials.236
But, of course, a shortage of questions has never been the
problem faced by scholars and courts trying to untangle United
States v. Nixon. Rather, what has been lacking so far is a
doctrinal structure capable of channeling broad political and
philosophical arguments into administrable legal rules for deciding specific information disputes. Treating Nixon as a federal common-law rule of constitutional interpretation provides
this structure and, as cases like Holder demonstrate, offers a
way out of the morass of abstract considerations that has thus
far plagued executive privilege jurisprudence.

235
Can Congress, for instance, compel an executive official to disclose the
identity of an informant? See George C. Fisher, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
2014–2015 STATUTORY AND CASE SUPPLEMENT 364–65 (reprinting the text of Proposed Rule of Evidence 510, proposed by the Supreme Court but not adopted by
Congress, which would have provided an evidentiary privilege for the identity of
government informers).
236
See Raoul Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4,
22–26 (1974); supra note 214 and accompanying text. As noted above, Holder
itself seems to raise this question. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v.
Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 n.7 (D.D.C. 2013).
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